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STATUTORY STALEMATE:
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
"No man's knowledge here can go beyond his experience."
John Locke
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1976 the South Carolina legislature embraced the then-popular national trend
of allowing injured consumers to recover from manufacturers under a strict products
liability theory. Section 15-73-10 of the South Carolina Code represents the
legislature's codification of that common law doctrine.' In drafting section 15-7310 of the South Carolina Code, the legislature adopted almost verbatim section
402A of2the Restatement (Second)of Torts, the section dealing with strict products
liability.
While implementing strict products liability principles was in vogue, however,
statutory adoption was not. South Carolina is, in fact, one of only a handful of
states that has codified section 402A principles Despite the best intentions of the
legislature, subsequent experience has shown that this codification created
significant obstacles to the refinement of an evolving area of law. Of particular
concern is the issue of whether comparative negligence should be allowed as a
defense to a section 15-73-10 strict products liability action in South Carolina. This
Article concludes that such a defense should be permitted, and the majority of
jurisdictions faced with this issue have agreed.
This Article's analysis of the South Carolina Supreme Court's previous
decisions in this area suggests a sort of statutory stalemate, which will be difficult
to break. Part II traces the history and evolution of American products liability law,
emphasizing the transition from the Restatement (Second)of Torts principles to the
principles embodied in section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability. Part mH focuses on the apparent impasse South Carolina faces with respect
to adopting comparative negligence as a defense to strict products liability. Finally,
Part IV analyzes the approaches of other statutory strict products liability states and
suggests that the best option for South Carolina might be repealing section 15-73-10
and replacing it with judicial adoption of the principles embodied in section 2 of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability.

1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
2. Compare id., with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (illustrating the
similarities between the two).
3. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABIUTY 3d § 16:20 (Timothy E. Travers et al. eds.,
1987 & Supp. 2004) (explaining that Arkansas, Indiana, Maine, and Oregon join South Carolina as the
only states to currently have a statutory version of section 402A strict products liability principles).
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II. ORIGINS OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Like the Phoenix, products liability rose from the ashes of the Industrial
Revolution." As the fires of the forges and furnaces swept the globe, men and
machines interacted more frequently, and these interactions increasingly resulted in
personal injury.' Increased productivity led to larger and more dispersed consumer
pools for manufacturers. As the likelihood of injury to more remote consumers
increased, so did consumer intolerance for the traditional judicial theory of limiting
recovery to those consumers in privity of contract with the manufacturer." This
intolerance found a voice in Justice Benjamin Cardozo when he decided in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. that consumers could, in fact, recover from
manufacturers under a negligence theory in the absence of a contractual
relationship
From this bedrock decision, negligence eventually became the
"primary basis of liability for [American] products liability claims."'
Despite the availability of negligence as an avenue for redress, consumers still
faced significant challenges when attempting to recover from manufacturers for
injuries resulting from defective products.9 Consumers bringing suchsuits still had
to prove all of the elements of negligence-duty, breach, cause-in-fact, proximate
cause, and damage.'0 Damage is generally fairly simple for the consumer to prove.
For example, severed fingers," a scarred forehead, 2 and charred skin 3 are all easily
recognizable personal injuries. Causation is generally more difficult to establish,
though usually not impossible to do.' 4 Investigations often can clearly indicate, for
example, that an unreasonably safe lawn mower injured a hand, 5 a negligently
constructed power tool produced a head injury, 6 or an infant's pajamas were not,
in fact, flame retardant.' 7 Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, a real difficulty for most

4. For a brief but effective history of the development of products liability law, see David Owen,
ProductsLiability Law Restated,49 S.C. L. REv. 273, 274-78 (1998) [hereinafter ProductsLiability
Law Restated].
5. See, e.g., id. at 274 ("During the first half ofthe twentieth century, negligence doctrine opened
up as the primary basis of liability for products liability claims.").
6. The 1842 English case Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), established that
a plaintiff could not recover from a manufacturer for personal injuries under a negligence theory
because privity of contract did not exist between the plaintiff and the manufacturer.
7. 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
8. ProductsLiability Law Restated,supra note 4, at 274. See also DAVID G. OWEN, M. STUART
MADDEN & MARY J. DAVIS, MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 1.5 (3d ed. 2000) (describing

the prominence of negligence in products liability law).
9. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3d, supra note 3, at 16:25.
10. See W. PAGE KEETON ETAL, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65(5th

ed. 1984).
11. See Saupitty v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., Inc., 726 F.2d 657, 659 (10th Cir. 1984).
12. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 898 (Cal. 1963).

13. See Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1980).
14. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABIUTY 3d, supranote 3, at 16:25.

15. See Saupitty, 726 F.2d at 659.
16. See Greenman, 377 P.2d at 899.
17. See Gryc, 297 N.W.2d at 739.
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consumers pursuing a negligence action against a manufacturer is establishing a
breach of duty."
MacPhersonv. BuickMotorCo. provides that a manufacturer breaches his duty
of care to a foreseeable consumer if the manufacturer's acts or omissions create an
unreasonable risk of harm. 9 This means that the injured consumer must
affirmatively show that the manufacturer unreasonably sacrificed product safety in
favor of cost savings.2 In other words, under a negligence products liability theory,

a manufacturer does not owe the consumer a duty to produce an absolutely safe
product, but rather it must take only those precautions that are reasonably necessary
to prevent foreseeable harm to foreseeable consumers.2
Additionally, the consumer faces the daunting reality that he is the final
recipient of a product that has often traveled a route as circuitous as Odysseus's
return to Ithaca. 2 Professor William L. Prosser described the consumer's plight as
follows:
There are other sellers than the manufacturer of the product. It
will pass through the hands of a whole line of other dealers, and
the plaintiff may have good reason to sue any or all of them. The
manufacturer is often beyond the jurisdiction. He may even, in
some cases, be unknown. If he is identified and can be sued, it is
very often impossible to pin the liability upon him. Even where
there is a proved defect which speaks of obvious negligence on
the part of some one, it may still not be possible to prove that it
was on the part of the maker.... If the plaintiff is to recover at

all, he must often look to the wholesaler, the jobber, and the
retailer.
It is here that negligence liability breaks down. The
wholesaler, the jobber, and the retailer normally are simply not
negligent. They are under no duty to test or inspect the chattel,
and they do not do so.... No inference of negligence can arise
against these sellers, and res ipsa loquitur is of no use at all. 3

18. See OwEN, MADDEN & DAVIS, supra note 8, § 1.15, at 20-21.
19. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
20. See OWEN, MADDEN & DAVIS, supra note 8, § 1. 15, at 15-17.

21. For a more comprehensive expression of this risk versus utility equation, see Judge Learned
Hand's opinion in United States v. CarrollTowing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1947). See
also Judge Cardozo's opinion in Palsgrafv.Long IslandRR Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (discussing

the relationship between foreseeability and culpability); OWEN, MADDEN & DAVIS, supra note 8, at 17
(explaining Judge Hand's "harmonious risk-benefit model").
22. In addition to traveling far afield, just as Odysseus wrought havoc upon Penelope's suitors,
so too do defective products often visit damage upon their ultimate consumers. See HOMER, THE
ODYSSEY (Butcher & Lang trans., MacMillan 1930).
23. William L. Prosser, The Assaultupon the Citadel(StrictLiabilityto the Consumer),69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1116-17 (1960) (citations omitted). See also 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABIUTY

3d, supra note 3, § 16:25 (expounding on various obstacles consumers face when bringing a products
liability suit founded upon negligence).
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A. Strict ProductsLiability
Understandably, these obstacles proved insurmountable in many cases.
Assuming that a consumer could even identify the original manufacturer,
affirmatively demonstrating that the manufacturer reasonably could have made a
product safer requires a substantial investment of money and time on the part of the
injured plaintiff. Consumer dissatisfaction with the difficulty of proving
manufacturer negligence grew over several decades and reached maturity in the
turbulent decades of the 1960s and 1970s. As the nation began to shuffle off the
coil of racial segregation and gender discrimination, so too did the courts embrace
a more liberal social view. 4
Beginning with Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,2s products liability
jurisprudence experienced an explosion of pro-consumer judicial decisions. In
Henningsen, the New Jersey Supreme Court found an automobile manufacturer
liable to a consumer who purchased the vehicle from an independent retailer.16 The
court refused to accept the defendant manufacturer's defenses of lack of privity of
contract and contractual disclaimer, reasoning that such broad disclaimers were
"violative of public policy and void."27
Professor David G. Owen described the importance of the Henningsendecision
as follows:
In allowing "strict liability" for breach of "warranty," but denying
the classic contract defenses, Henningsen effectively adopted a
principle of strict liability in "tort." So reasoned Justice Traynor
for the California Supreme Court three years later ...

and so

pronounced the American Law Institute, in section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the following year.2"
1. Section 402A Restatement (Second) of Torts
The California Supreme Court decision to which Professor Owen referred in
his article, The FaultPit,29 was the landmark Greenman v. Yuba PowerProducts,

Inc.3" Greenman was the first court decision to recognize and address consumer

24. Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia comprise the minority of
jurisdictions rejecting § 402A strict liability. See 2 AMERCANLAWOF PRODUCTSLIABIUTY 3d, supra
note 3, § 16:14.
25. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
26. Id. at 84.
27. Id. at 97. See also Products Liability Law Restated,supra note 4, at 276 n.23 (explaining
the Henningsen decision).
28. David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REv. 703, 713-14 (1992) (citations omitted)
[hereinafter The FaultPit].
29. Id. at 713.

30. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
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negligence. 3 The result
concerns over the difficulty in establishing manufacturer
32

was the doctrine of strict products liability in tort.

As Professor Owen indicated, the general popularity of strict products liability
principles ensured and demanded inclusion of section 402A in the 1965 publication
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.33 In essence, section 402A addresses three
policy ideas: 1) the manufacturer is better equipped to spread the cost resulting from
defective products by passing the price increase on to consumers, 2) the imposition
of strict liability will increase manufacturers' awareness of product safety and will,
in turn, ensure safer products, and 3) eliminating the need for proof of fault will
remove the often prohibitive litigation costs that prevent injured consumers from
recovering for their injuries.34
In theory, section 402A purports to apply a single standard to what are widely
recognized to be three distinct defectiveness theories-manufacturing defects,
design defects, and inadequate warnings. 35 At section 402A's inception, this
solitary standard seemed sufficient because the sole question with regard to
manufacturer liability appeared to be whether a product was "too dangerous
(defective) or safe enough (nondefective). 36 However, as products liability law
37
evolved, the "various forms of product dangers increasingly revealed themselves.
By the 1980s, scholars and judges reflected the public's shift in attitude toward
the strong pro-consumer principles of section 402A.38 Responding to the so-called

31. See OWEN, MADDEN & DAvIS, supra note 8, § 1.5, at 21; ProductsLiabilityLaw Restated,
supranote 4, at 272.
32. See Greenman, 377 P.2d at 900. See also ProductsLiability Law Restated, supra note 4, at
277 (explaining Justice Traynor's reasoning and conclusions).
33. Products Liability Law Restated, supra note 4, at 277. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965).
34. Paraphrasing KEETON ET AL, supra note 10, at § 98, at 692-93. See also John E.
Montgomery & David G. Owen, Reflections on the Theory andAdministrationof Strict Tort Liability
for Defective Products,27 S.C. L. REV. 803,809-10 (1976) (providing a concise summary of general
principles behind strict products liability).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A provides the following:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id. (emphasis added). See ProductsLiability Law Restated, supranote 4, at 282.
36. ProductsLiability Law Restated, supra note 4, at 282.
37. Id.
38. See The FaultPit,supra note 28, at 714-15.
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"liability crises" of the 1980s, courts increasingly claimed to apply a strict liability
standard to design and warning defect cases, but in reality they assessed whether the
manufacturer reasonably could have made the product safer.39 The apparent tailspin
into which products liability law seemed to have slipped led W. Kip Viscusi to
write, in 1991, that:
The overall objective of products liability should be to foster
appropriate incentives for accident deterrence and to provide
insurance of accident victims' losses to the extent that doing so is
feasible. Retaining strict liability for manufacturing defects is
feasible, but in the case of design defects I advocate a
reformulation of the risk-utility test that more closely resembles a
formalized negligence standard.'
Faced with the indisputable fact that the law was, in practice, being applied
differently than expressed in section 402A, the American Law Institute decided to
call a spade a spade.
2. Sections 1 & 2 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability expressly recognizes the
three distinct areas of product defects."' Section 2 applies a strict liability standard
to manufacturing defect cases.42 This section essentially restates the standard

39. See, e.g., Hurley v. Motor Coach Indus., 222 F.3d 377 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing an Illinois
products liability statute that allows evidence of alternative designs to be considered); Artis v. Corona
Corp. of Japan, 703 A.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating explicitly that a risk-utility test was to be
applied in a defective design case); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1982)
(deciding that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence of reasonable alternative designs to
support either a negligence or design defect cause of action). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a (1998) (describing the increasingly apparent divergence in the
manner in which courts were dealing with manufacturing defect cases and design/warning defect cases).
40. W. KIP VIscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 11-12 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991).
41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1-2. Section 1provides that
"[o]ne engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a
defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect." Though
this section seems to maintain the unitary standard of section 402A, section 2 clearly delineates the
three areas of product defects.
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 provides the following:
A product is defective when, at the time of the sale or distribution, it
contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of
inadequate instructions or warnings. A product:
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs
from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised
in the preparation and marketing of the product;
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other
distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution,
and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not
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adopted by section 402A, but it appropriately confines that standard to those cases
involving manufacturing defects.43 Comment a to section 2 describes the traditional
rationale for
theories behind strict products liability mentioned
44 above as the main
maintaining the manufacturing defect standard.
More importantly, section 2 also rejects the section 402A notion that strict
liability is appropriate for design defect and inadequate warning cases. 4 Section
2 explicitly verbalizes what courts across the nation have been implicitlypracticing:
applying a "risk-utility balancing" standard that more closely resembles negligence
than strict liability.' This revolution in doctrine demonstrates the ongoing
evolution of products liability law. It also appears to validate Professor Owen's
hypothesis that "whether the law of torts turns to freedom, vested rights, equality,
or utility as the primary determinant of responsibility for harm, it rests at bottom on
principles of moral fault."' 7

reasonably safe;
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission ofthe instructions
or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 2 cmt. a. This comment provides the following:
Strict liability without fault in this context is generally believed to foster several
objectives. On the premise that tort law serves the instrumental function of
creating safety incentives, imposing strict liability on manufacturers for harm
caused by manufacturing defects encourages greater investment in product safety
than does a regime of fault-based liability under which, as a practical matter,
sellers may escape their appropriate share of responsibility. Some courts and
commentators also have said that strict liability discourages the consumption of
defective products by causing the purchase price of products to reflect, more than
would a rule of negligence, the costs of defects. And by eliminating the issue of
manufacturer fault from plaintiff's case, strict liability reduces the transaction
costs involved in litigating that issue.
Several important fairness concerns are also believed to support
manufacturers' liability for manufacturing defects even if the plaintiff is unable
to show that the manufacturer's quality control fails to meet risk-utility norms....
Strict liability therefore performs a function similar to the concept of res ipsa
loquitur, allowing deserving plaintiffs to succeed notwithstanding what would
otherwise be difficult or insuperable problems of proof.
45. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABIUTY § 2 (1998).
46. Though the majority of states still claim to adhere to section 402A principles, it is apparent
that they are, in fact, applying section 2 principles. Therefore, it seems likely that jurisdictions will
begin formally to adopt the new principles since they more accurately reflect judicial practice. Indeed,
Iowa has already adopted Sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability as
its standard for products liability cases. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2
cmt. d; see supra note 41 and accompanying text. See Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159,
169 (Iowa 2002).
47. The FaultPit,supra note 28, at 723.
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SOUTH CAROLINA AND STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILrrY

Understanding the evolving nature of products liability and where the doctrine
stands today equips the observer to evaluate the effectiveness of South Carolina's
current strict products liability policy. As previously mentioned, the South Carolina
legislature adopted almost verbatim section 402A when it enacted section 15-73-10
of the South Carolina Code." Though the principles of strict products liability were
extremely popular in the 1970s, most jurisdictions phased them into their respective
jurisprudence through judicial decision."' Statutory adoption was clearly a minority
position. s
Motivated by what two commentators called impatience "with the inaction of
the state supreme court,"'" the South Carolina legislature codified section 402A
principles. In so doing, however, the legislature seems to have given little thought
to the significant complexities involved in the area of products liability law.
Judicial adoption, the more popular form of integrating section 402A principles,
gives the judiciary significant latitude in shaping its state's products liability policy.
Statutory adoption, on the other hand, presents significant obstacles to such judicial
shaping.
Through statutory adoption, the South Carolina legislature made clear that it
endorsed the idea of strict liability for manufacturers of defective products.
However, it did not make clear what its theoretical understanding of strict products
liability was." Nor did it clarify "the manner in which [strict products liability]
differs from negligence, the appropriate roles ofjudge and jury in the administration
of the doctrine, and the proper role in strict tort cases of the traditional affirmative
defenses of negligence law." 3
Perhaps acknowledging this dearth of guidance, the legislature incorporated by
54
reference the official comments to section 402A as evidence of legislative intent.
This incorporation is really the root of the problem with respect to the question of
whether comparative negligence should be allowed as a defense to strict products
liability actions in South Carolina.
Comment n to section 402A addresses the applicability of contributory
negligence to strict products liability actions. 5 Logically, if the defendant is liable,

48. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.

49. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
50. Id.
51. Montgomery & Owen, supra note 34, at 803.
52. Id. at 807.
53. Id. at 807-08 (citations omitted) (presaging, in a way, the difficulties facing South Carolina
today in determining whether comparative negligence should be a defense to strict products liability).
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976). See Curcio v. Caterpillar, Inc., 344 S.C.

266, 273, 543 S.E.2d 264, 267 (Ct. App. 2001), rev'd 355 S.C. 316, 320, 585 S.E.2d 272, 274 (2003)
(providing a discussion of the incorporated comments as evidence of legislative intent).
55. This comment states:
Contributorynegligence. Since the liability with which this Section deals is not
based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict
liability cases (see § 524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not
a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect
in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other
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not because of an assessment of fault, but rather in the absence of fault-hence
strictly liable-issues of comparative fault are irrelevant. Following this logic, the
South Carolina Court of Appeals held that contributory negligence was not a
defense to a section 15-73-10 strict products liability action. 56 The Wallace court
explained that "[i]n South Carolina, contributory negligence is an affirmative
defense to an action for negligence. It has no application to an action based on
breach of warranty or liability for a defective product."57
Rather than clarify the law of products liability in South Carolina, Wallace
muddied the water, for the South Carolina Supreme Court subsequently rejected
contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence as a defense to
negligence actions in Nelson v. ConcreteSupply Co.5' This change demonstrated
the Court's desire to adopt a "more equitable doctrine." 59
A. The ComparativeNegligence Question
The comparative negligence doctrine assesses damages to the parties in a
negligence action based on the relative fault of those parties.6" This doctrine
developed in response to the general dissatisfaction with contributory negligence,
which "places upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which two are, by
hypothesis, responsible."" The jurisdictions adopting comparative negligence have
adopted it in one of three forms: pure, modified, and slight-gross."' South Carolina
adopted the modified form in Nelson.' 3 This form ofcomparative negligence allows
the plaintiff to recover damages only if his contributory negligence is equal to or
less than that -of the defendant." When a plaintiff is allowed to recover, "[t]he

hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and

unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes
under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other
cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware
of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use ofthe product
and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 2, § 402A cmt. n.

56. Wallace v. Owens-linois, Inc., 300 S.C. 518, 523, 389 S.E.2d 155, 157 (Ct. App. 1989).
57. Id.
58. 303 S.C. 243, 244, 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1991).

59. Id.
60. KEETON Er AL, supra note 10, § 67, at 470.
61. Id. at 468-69.
62. Id. at 471. Pure comparative negligence reduces the plaintiff's recovery in proportion to his
fault. Id. at 472. Modified comparative negligence does not "bar recovery so long as it remains below
a specified proportion of the total fault." Id. at 473 (citations omitted). Two types of comparative
negligence exist, equal fault bar and greater fault bar. Id. The equal fault bar does not allow recovery
if plaintiff's "fault is equal to or granter than" defendant's fault. Id. The greater fault bar approach
prevents plaintiff from recovery "only ifhis fault exceeds the defendant's." KEETON, ETAL, supranote
10, at 473. Finally, the-slight-gross system bars plaintiff's "recovery unless his negligence is 'slight,'
and the defendant's negligence by comparison is 'gross."' Id. at 474.
63. See Nelson, 303 S.C. at 245, 399 S.E.2d at 784.

64. See supra note 62.
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amount of the plaintiff's recovery shall be reduced in proportion to the amount of
his or her negligence." 65
While section 402A's comment n rejects contributory negligence, it accepts the
assumption of risk concept and is silent on the issue of comparative negligence."
The logical assumption drawn from this fact is that the Restatement's rejection of
contributory negligence is most likely a reaction to the rather harsh result that
occurs when an injured plaintiff, who is only minimally at fault, is, as a result of his
own negligence, completely barred from recovery. 6 For actions based on pure
strict liability, this is a sensible approach. As indicated above, however, the modem
conception of product defect classification is one of a trifurcated system.68 Courts
assess.,only manufacturing defects with a truly strict liability standard.69 Design
defect and inadequate warning cases are, in practice, evaluated by a risk-utility test
more akin to negligence.7"
As explained above, South Carolina rejected contributory negligence in favor
of comparative negligence because of considerations of fairness and equity.7 The
desire to abandon the inflexible rules and imbalanced results of contributory
negligence is not unique to South Carolina. Embracing apportionment of damages
is a modem trend.72 The same concepts of parity and equity that drove South
Carolina to abandon contributory negligence have led other jurisdictions to adopt
comparative negligence as a defense to strict products liability actions.73
In Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., the South Carolina Court of Appeals
acknowledged the genesis ofthe strict products liability doctrine mentioned above'
and clearly articulated some of the state's policy goals when it declared that "[s]trict
products liability in tort was created judicially because of the economic and social
need for the protection of consumers in an increasingly complex and mechanized
society, and because of the limitations of negligence and warranty remedies."7 "
Using nearly identical language, the California Supreme Court, in Daly v.
GeneralMotors Corp., explained California's reasons for adopting strict products
liability: "[Strict products] liability was created judicially because of the economic
and social need for the protection of consumers in an increasingly complex and
mechanized society, and because of the limitations in the negligence and warranty
remedies." 76 However, the Daly court cautioned, "[S]trict liability has never been,

65. Nelson, 303 S.C. at 245, 399 S.E.2d at 784.
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965).
67. See KEETON ET AL., supranote 10, § 67, at 468-69 (explaining the inequities of contributory
negligence).
68. ProductsLiability Law Restated,supra note 4, at 282.
69. Id. at 283-85.
70. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (1998).
71. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
73. See generally Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Applicability ofComparativeNegligence
Doctrine to Actions Based on Strict Liability in Tort, 9 A.L.R. 4th 633 (1981-2004) (providing a
general discussion of different jurisdictions' treatment of this issue).

74. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 10, § 98, at 692.
75. 319 S.C. 531, 542,462 S.E.2d 321, 327 (Ct. App. 1995).
76. 575 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Cal. 1978).
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and is not now, absolute liability.... [T]he manufacturer does not thereby become
the insurer of the safety of the product's user.""
In commenting on its decision to embrace the doctrine of strict products
liability, the Supreme Court of Hawaii articulated a slightly broader range of policy
goals by explaining:
The leading arguments for the adoption of a rule of strict products
liability have been that the public interest in human life and safety
requires the maximum possible protection that the law can muster
against dangerous defects in products; that by placing the goods
on the market the maker and those in the chain of distribution
represent to the public that the products are suitable and safe for
use; and that the burden of accidental injuries caused by defective
chattels should be placed upon those in the chain of distribution
business and as an incentive to guard against
as a cost of doing
78
such defects.
While most jurisdictions have conceptually similar strict products liability
policy goals, many have wrestled with the question of whether comparative
negligence should be permitted as a defense in a strict products liability action.
Though some states have concluded that comparative negligence should not be
allowed as a defense,79 the majority of jurisdictions deciding this issue have
permitted the defense."0
Hawaii is typical of the numerous jurisdictions that have accepted comparative
negligence as a defense to strict products liability claims. The Stewart decision
clearly demonstrates Hawaii's concern for consumer protection, yet the Hawaii
Supreme Court subsequently decided that adopting comparative negligence as a
defense to strict products liability claims would not negatively affect this policy
goal. 8' In Kaneko v. Hilo CoastProcessing,the Hawaii Supreme Court observed
that "those [jurisdictions] who oppose the merger [of strict products liability and
comparative negligence] believe that negligence and strict liability are different
theories and therefore are not compatible. Those jurisdictions that are in favor of
the merger argue that fairness and equity are more important than semantic
consistency."" 2
In Daly, the California Supreme Court similarly eschewed theoretical and
linguistic hair-splitting in favor of equitable principles, allowing comparative
negligence to be asserted as a defense to strict products liability. 3 The Daly court
77. Id.
78. Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240, 243 (Haw. 1970).
79. See Eclavea, supra note 73, § 3.
80. KEETON ET AL, supra note 10, § 67, at 478; see also Eclavea, supra note 73, § 4 (listing
Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, Texas, Tennessee, and Washington as some of the states having joined the majority of
jurisdictions allowing comparative negligence as a defense to strict products liability).
81. Stewart, 470 P.2d at 240.
82. 654 P.2d 343, 352 (Haw. 1982) (emphasis added).
83. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1169 (Cal. 1978).
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reasoned its strict products liability policy goals would not be hampered by adopting
the comparative negligence defense because "[p]laintiffs will continue to be
relieved of proving that the manufacturer or distributor was negligent in the
production, design, or dissemination of the article in question.,1 4 The court went
on to declare that any "loss should be assessed equitably in proportion to fault." '
In contrast, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided not to allow comparative
negligence as a defense to strict products liability actions in Kimco Development
Corp. v. MichaelD's CarpetOutlets."6 The Kimco court explained that its policy
goals for employing strict products liability focused on protecting the consumer and
the marketplace from defective manufacturing. 7 It felt these policy goals were
incompatible with principles of comparative fault because "the underlying purpose
of strict
product liability is undermined by introducing negligence concepts into
8
it.",t
Although some states share the Pennsylvania view,89 the strength of its
reasoning is questionable. Most jurisdictions would agree that protecting the
consumer from defective products is of paramount importance. The California and
Hawaii courts concurred, but felt that allowing comparative negligence as a defense
to strict products liability actions would not threaten this important policy goal.9"
Instead, these courts believed promoting fairness and equity could, and should, be
achieved while
continuing to provide the market and the consumer the protection
91
they require.
Professor Owen recognizes the popularity of these sentiments from a more
doctrinal perspective:
[Courts] no doubt will continue to purport to apply "strict"
liability doctrine to products liability in the years ahead, so that
the "law" of strict liability should by no means be expected to
vanish quickly from the landscape. But the "strictness" in
products liability doctrine has been stripped of much of its
practical and moral force, and the trend toward its express
abandonment should be expected to continue.92
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, reflecting the
modem trend towards apportionment of damages, suggests a policy of determining
comparative responsibilityin the case of strict products liability:
The plaintiff is still relieved of the necessity of proving fault to
prove that the product was defective, but the defendant can

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 1168.
Id. at 1169.
637 A.2d 603, 607 (Pa. 1993).
Id. at 606.
Id.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
The FaultPit,supranote 28, at 710.
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introduce evidence related to the absence of fault to reduce its
percentage of responsibility. This is consistent with at least one
goal of strict liability, which is to relieve the plaintiff of the
difficulty of proving fault.93
In Nelson, the South Carolina Supreme Court expressed its desire to jettison
contributory negligence because of its unfairness.94 Logic suggests South
Carolina's desire for equity, as stated in Nelson, would make the California and
Hawaii approach to comparative negligence, as a defense to strict products liability
actions, attractive to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Equally attractive should
be the realization that the consumer protection policy goals described in Bragg,
which prompted South Carolina to adopt strict products liability in the first place,
would not be compromised by adopting comparative negligence as a defense.9"
Together, these concepts frame an approach to the issue that is consistent with
South Carolina's goals and the modem trend towards apportionment of damages.
Why, then, has the South Carolina Supreme Court not adopted comparative
negligence as a defense to strict products liability claims? Is it not odd that the
California Supreme Court-the same court that handed down Greenman, which
spawned section 402A-subsequently endorsed comparative negligence as a
defense, yet South Carolina, which so strongly approved of section 402A that it
legislatively adopted it, has yet to do so? As mentioned above, the problem seems
to lie in the statutory stalemate created by the legislative adoption of section 402A
and, more specifically, the legislature's incorporation of section 402A comments
as evidence of legislative intent."
B. The ComparativeNegligence Answer
In Barnwell v. Barber-Colman Co., the South Carolina Supreme Court
articulated why it would not allow punitive damages to be recovered in a section 1573-10 strict products liability action:
Where the legislature has, by statute, acted upon a subject, the
judiciary is limited to interpretation and construction of that
statute....
It is perhaps unnecessary to say that Courts have no
legislative power, and in the interpretation and
construction of statutes their sole function is to
determine, and within the constitutional limits of the
legislative power to give effect to, the intention of the
Legislature. They cannot read into a statute something
that is not within the manifest intention ofthe Legislature
as gathered from the statute itself. To depart from the
meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute, to

93.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILTY § 8 cmt. c (2000).

94. Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 244, 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1991).
95. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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legislate and not to interpret. The responsibility for the
justice or wisdom oflegislation rests with the Legislature,
and it is the province of the Courts to construe, not to
make, the laws.
If the Act is to be amended so as to provide for the recovery of
punitive damages, this must be accomplished by the legislature,
not the courts.97
The majority's opinion clearly explains that legislative enactment of section
402A principles demands significant judicial deference with respect to strict
products liability decisions.9 The opinion dismisses a compelling dissent which
presents an argument conceptually similar to the position on comparative
negligence offered in this Article.99 The court states:
Citing numerous decisions from other jurisdictions which
permit recovery of punitive damages in strict liability, the dissent
concludes that our decision places South Carolina in a minority.
The conclusion is misleading, in that this Court is compelled to
interpret the laws of the General Assembly in their plain meaning,
whether or not the result places South Carolina in the minority
among jurisdictions. Our State is one of a small number which
initially adopted strict liability, not by judicial decision, but
through legislative enactment."
The South Carolina Supreme Court's position on punitive damages is obviously
not dispositive of its position on comparative negligence. Indeed, section 15-73-10
expressly limits recovery to damages resulting from physical harm,'"' while
comment n is silent with regard to comparative negligence. 0 2 Robert H. Brunson
makes a compelling argument in favor of adopting comparative negligence as a
defense to South Carolina products liability crashworthiness cases. 3 Brunson
further predicts judicial acceptance of comparative negligence principles based on
then-recent South Carolina Supreme Court decisions that held comparative

97. 301 S.C. 534, 537-38, 393 S.E.2d 162, 163-64 (1989) (quoting Creech v. S.C. Pub. Serv.
Auth., 200 S.C. 127, 146, 20 S.E.2d 645, 652 (1942)). It is informative to note how the majority's
treatment of the dissent implies a narrow interpretation of comment m of section 402A. For another

South Carolina case in which the court demonstrated a narrow interpretation of the incorporated
comments, see Curcio v. Caterpillar,Inc., 344 S.C. 266,273, 543 S.E.2d 264,267 (Ct. App. 2001),
rev'd 355 S.C. 316, 585 S.E.2d 272 (2003) (reversing based on lower court's failure to apply correct

standard for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
98. Barnwell, 301 S.C. at 537-38, 393 S.E.2d at 163-64.
99. Id. at 538-43, 393 S.E.2d at 164-66 (Finney, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 537, 393 S.E.2d at 163 (citations omitted).
101. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).

102. See supra note 55.
103. Robert H. Brunson, ComparingFirstCollision "Fault" with Second Collision "Defect,"
S.C. LAwYER, Aug. 1999, at 39 (presenting the familiar argument of fairness and equity).
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negligence had subsumed the defenses of assumption of risk and last clear
chance."°
However, these cases deal with the application of comparative negligence in
negligence causes of action. With respect to strict products liability actions,
Barnwell and Curcio indicate the South Carolina Supreme Court's high degree of
aversion to a broad interpretation of section 15-73-10.o5 This obvious reluctance
to modernize its interpretation of section 15-73-10 and the incorporated
comments-to recognize that design defects and inadequate warnings are evaluated
according to fault despite being called strict liability°--suggests that the South
Carolina Supreme Court would feel obligated to reject comparative negligence as
a defense to strict products liability. Professors F. Patrick Hubbard and Robert L.
Felix conveyed much the same thought in their article, ComparativeNegligence in
South Carolina:Implementing Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co.: °7
Although some states have included strict products liability in
their comparative schemes, it is not likely that South Carolina will
do so ....
... Because strict liability for products is a statutory scheme,
the courts are likely to be hesitant to alter the scheme by imposing
a new and judicially-developed approach to defenses within this
scheme. This deference to the legislative scheme is particularly
important because the Nelson court adopted a modified approach
to comparative fault. Under this modified system a plaintiff is
partially barred if the plaintiff was equally or less negligent than
the defendant and totally barred if the plaintiff was more
negligent. Thus, ifNelson were applied to strict products liability,
the resulting change in the statutory scheme would be unfavorable
to plaintiffs in some fact situations.0"
IV. OPTIONS FOR CHANGE

With respect to the applicability of comparative negligence to strict products
liability, South Carolina, not unlike Robert Frost's nostalgic traveler,"° seems to
have reached a divergence in the jurisprudential woods. Either the South Carolina
Supreme Court can set aside its concerns over judicial legislation, or the legislature
can realize that its experience with strict products liability was limited in 1976 and

104. Id. at 44-45; see also Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime, 333
S.C. 71, 508 S.E.2d 565 (1998) (finding assumption of risk and comparative negligence to be
incongruous); Spahn v. Town of Port Royal, 330 S.C. 168, 499 S.E.2d 205 (1998) (finding last clear
chance to have been subsumed by comparative negligence).
105. See supra note 97-100.
106. See supra Part II.A.
107. F. Patrick Hubbard & Robert L. Felix, Comparative Negligence in South Carolina.
Implementing Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 43 S.C. L. REv. 273 (1992).
108. Id. at 296-97 (citations omitted).

109. See ROBERT FROST, The Road Not Taken, in MouNTAn INTERvAL 9 (1916).
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that section 15-73-10 reflects an equally limited knowledge of strict products
liability. An examination of the other states that legislatively adopted section 402A
principles coupled with an understanding of the South Carolina Supreme Court's
reluctance to broadly construe section 15-73-10 suggest that between these two
choices the State will take "the one less traveled by.""'
As discussed above, Arkansas, Indiana, Maine, and Oregonjoin South Carolina
as the only states to currently have a statutory version of section 402A strict
Arkansas legislatively adopted section 402A
products liability principles.
principles in 1973."' Section 85-2-318.2 of the Arkansas Statutes adopted section
402A essentially verbatim; however, it broadened section 402A's scope "by
substituting 'supplier' for 'seller' and injury to 'persons and property' for 'users'
or 'consumers."' 113 Despite this broad sweep by the legislature, the Arkansas
Supreme Court, in construing the meaning of "unreasonably dangerous" and
"defective condition," concluded that "it was not the intent of 402A to make
manufacturers insurers of their products, irrespective of fault or warranty, and going
beyond foreseeable consequences, and hence to apply strict liability simply on the
of 'defective condition' widens the scope of 402A
basis of a finding
' 14
considerably." "

Arkansas also legislatively adopted comparative negligence as an affirmative
defense in actions in which "recovery is predicated upon fault."" 5 In either a show
of deference to the legislature's adoption of comparative fault or an
acknowledgment of the moderate principles expressed in Berkeley Pump-or
perhaps a little of both--the Arkansas Supreme Court has found comparative
negligence to be applicable in strict products liability actions. 16 In Elk Corp. of
Arkansas v. Jackson, the Arkansas Supreme Court declared that "strict liability is
not absolute liability in Arkansas." '" 7 The court explained that a manufacturer can
be at "fault" for simply "'supplying a product in a defective condition.""'" The
court also explained that "[a] plaintiff in a strict product liability action can also be
at fault.""' 9 These statements led the Arkansas Supreme Court to the logical
conclusion that comparative negligence and strict products liability are not mutually
exclusive doctrines. 20
The Indiana legislature also legislatively adopted section 402A principles in the
Indiana Products Liability Act (IPLA) in 1978.21 This statute codified section
402A and governed only those products liability claims brought under a strict

110. See FROST, supra note 109. Hopefully, this choice will make "all the difference." Id.
111. See supra note 3.
112. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 85-2-318.2 (Michie 1973) (current version at ARK. CODE ANN. § 486-102 (Lexis 2001)).
113. Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 653 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Ark. 1983).
114. Id.at 132.
115. ARK. CODEANN. § 16-64-122 (Michie 1987).
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Elk Corp. of Ark. v. Jackson, 725 S.W.2d 829 (Ark. 1987).
Id.at 833.
Id. (citing AMI Civil 2d, No. 306).
Id.
Id.
IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-1 (Michie 2004).
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liability theory. Indiana's Comparative Fault Act was not applicable to IPLA claims
but was relevant to products liability claims brought under a negligence theory. 2
In 1995 the Indiana legislature reformed the IPLA through a series of
amendments. Perhaps recognizing the inconsistency in applying the strict liability
standards of the old IPLA to design defect and inadequate warning actions, the
legislature ensured that the new statute governed all products liability actions
"regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which the action is
brought."'2 3 The 1995 amendments also codified comparative negligence as a
defense to strict products liability: "In a product liability action.., the fault of all
others who caused or contributed to cause the harm, shall be compared by the trier
of fact ....
,24
Maine's approach to the comparative negligence-strict products liability
question illuminates jurisdictions' enduring struggle to define the roles and limits
of their judicial and legislative branches. Maine's strict products liability statute is
principally modeled on section 402A.' However, judicial interpretation of this
statute has focused largely on negligence concepts." 6 Displaying a strikingly
similar approach to that of the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Maine Supreme
Court concluded in Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. that the statutory
limitations imposed by legislative adoption of both strict products liability and
comparative negligence prohibited comparative fault as a defense to strict products
liability unless that fault consisted solely of assumption of risk. 2 '
Since South Carolina adopted comparative negligence judicially rather than
legislatively, it is interesting to note how the Austin court considered California's
treatment of the comparative negligence issue. The Austin court compared the
relative flexibility and freedom that judicial adoption of strict products liability
created in California with the restrictions imposed by statutory adoption of those
principles in Maine.' The court explained that "Daly represents the California
court's completion of the judicial evolution of a consistent body of products liability
law. In contrast, in Maine both the strict liability and comparative negligence
rules
29
have been legislatively imposed, with their own special constraints.'
The difference in statutory and judicial adoptions of comparative negligence is
an important and distinguishing factor between Maine and South Carolina.
Interestingly, Oregon found itself in a situation almost identical to Maine's.
Oregon's legislature, like South Carolina's, codified section 402A and specifically

122. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-2 (amended and recodified by §§ 34-20-1-1 et seq. (1998)).
123. IND. CODEANN. § 34-20-1-1 (Lexis 1998).
124. IND. CODE ANN.§ 34-20-8-1.
125. ME. REV.STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 221 (West 1964).
126. See Ames v. Dipietro-Kay Corp., 617 A.2d 559, 561 (Me. 1992) (citing Marois v. Paper
Converting Mach. Co., 539 A.2d 621,623 (Me.. 1988)); see also Bernier v. Raymark Indus., 516 A.2d
534, 538 (Me. 1986); PRODUCTS LIABIUTY DESK REFERENCE: A FIFrY-STATE COMPENDIUM 271-76

(Morton F.Daller ed., 2003) (describing this phenomenon and presenting these cases).
127. 471 A.2d 280, 285-88 (Me. 1984).
128. Id. at 287-88.
129. Id.
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referenced the official comments as legislative intent. 3 ' Oregon's legislature, like
Maine's, subsequently enacted a comparative fault statute."
Unlike Maine, however, Oregon's Supreme Court concluded that comparative
negligence was an acceptable defense to strict products liability in Baccelleri v.
' The court deduced from a legislative memorandum that comparative
Hyster Co. 32
negligence as a defense to strict products liability was reasonably within the
contemplation of the legislature when it enacted the comparative fault act.' 33 Note
once again, however, that South Carolina adopted comparative negligence judicially
rather than legislatively.'34
Synthesizing the reasoning behind these states' choices regarding the
applicability of comparative negligence to strict products liability produces an
interesting picture. Not surprisingly, almost every state that legislatively adopted
strict products liability also legislatively adopted comparative negligence: South
Carolina is the exception.'3 5 Some of the highest courts of these states deferred to
the legislature and declined to adopt comparative negligence as a defense to strict
liability. 136 Yet, even in the face of legislative action on the subject, courts in other

states found that comparative negligence was a defense to such actions.' 37
The fact that South Carolina's judiciary, rather than its legislative branch, was
responsible for the rejection of contributory negligence in favor of comparative
negligence would seem to suggest an environment more receptive to judicial
application of that doctrine to strict products liability. However, as noted above, the
South Carolina Supreme Court may be less willing to apply comparative negligence
to strict products liability than are some jurisdictions in which comparative
negligence was legislatively adopted.'
Based on this analysis of the other jurisdictions that legislatively adopted strict
products liability, it follows that judicial handling of the strict products liabilitycomparative negligence question is the more common method. However, another
approach exists-one implicated by Indiana's treatment of the issue.3 9 Legislative
action, specifically the act of repealing the state's outdated section 402A-based
statutes, seems to be the road "less traveled by."'"
Louisiana tentatively explored this less traveled road in 1996 when it gutted its
strict products liability statute.' 4 ' Yet, like Indiana, Louisiana filled the resulting
void with another legislative creation. 42 Though these legislatures were attempting

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

OR. REV. STAT. § 30.920(3) (2003).
OR. REv. STAT. § 31.600 (2003).
597 P.2d 351 (Or. 1979).
Id. at 354.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 111-34 and accompanying
See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying
See supra notes 115-34 and accompanying
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.

140. See FROST, supranote 109.
141. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2317 (West 1997) (effectively repealed by LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.

2317.1 (West 1997)).
142. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2317.1 (West 1997); see supra notes 122-24 and accompanying
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to resolve the theoretical inconsistencies resulting from application of their statutes,
they only addressed half the problem by replacing one legislative construction with
another.
What will happen in another thirty years if the "pendulum of American
products liability" 43 begins to swing again? How will the courts address the next
problem created by the lack of legislative foresight? The answer in South Carolina
seems to be that the judiciary will feel constrained by statutory restrictions and then
will simply decline to update the law through judicial interpretation. The South
Carolina legislature could not have intended this result when it enacted section 1573-10 of the South Carolina Code.
When the legislature enacts a valid statute that specifically and narrowly
addresses an issue, which it arguably has done here, the judiciary must accord the
enactment due deference. However, the legislature is not faced daily with the
implications of judicially interpreting a statute that is broad in scope yet narrow in
latitude. The legislature is, therefore, often unaware of the nuances that cause the
judiciary to wrestle with defining its ability to interpret a statute. The result is a sort
of statutory stalemate under which refinement of evolving areas of the law like
products liability is inhibited to the detriment of society.
Judicial deference to the legislature is a necessary and admirable component of
the American form of democracy.' 44 Equally prominent in our Great Experiment
is the judiciary's ability to create law through judicial decision.'45 The symbiotic
relationship so created is delicate and must be carefully cultivated.'" At times, the
judiciary must accept that certain laws are perhaps not the most effective or
efficient, but they are nonetheless valid. An important counter-point is that the
legislature must constantly evaluate its existing laws against the ebb and flow of
time.
With respect to the applicability of comparative negligence to strict products
liability in South Carolina, the time has come for the legislature to fulfill its part of
this agreement. The South Carolina legislature should recognize that products
liability law has evolved significantly since the enactment of section 15-73-10. A
truly strict liability standard is not used to measure design defect and inadequate
warning causes of action, but rather a risk-utility equation that assesses fault is used
to evaluate them. This recognition, coupled with the realization that the South
Carolina Supreme Court feels powerless to do anything about it-lest it fail to
faithfully discharge its obligations in the precarious relationship that is our
trifurcated system of government-should prompt the legislature to unbind the
Supreme Court's hands by repealing section 15-73-10.
In its place, the South Carolina Supreme Court should adopt judicially the
modem products liability principles embodied in section 2 of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability. This judicial adoption is preferred over
subsequent legislative action because of the flexibility it affords.

143. Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products LiabilityMore Protective Than
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 TENN. L. REv. 985, 1019 (1998).
144. THE FEDERAuST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Products liability has evolved significantly since Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, and this evolution can be expected to continue. Any attempt by the
legislature to craft specific statutory solutions for such a dynamic area of law will
not solve today's problems but will only postpone them until tomorrow. In order
to effectively govern products liability law, flexibility is required. The legislature
would be wise to heed John Locke's admonition and accept, as all humans must,
that knowledge can never exceed experience. Because the South Carolina Supreme
Court will likely never feel comfortable broadly interpreting section 15-73-10 and
because the principles embodied in section 15-73-10 are in conflict with current
products liability law, the legislature should repeal section 15-73-10. In its place
the judiciary should adopt the modem products liability principles embodied in
section 2 of the Restatement (Third)of Torts: Products Liability. This, it seems, is
the most effective way to successfully break South Carolina's strict products
liability statutory stalemate.
Andrew A. Bennington
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